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Abstract 
MCTs pose new opportunities and challenges to university governance. Not only are 
the devices widespread, they have particular capabilities and constantly changing 
uses which makes any governing of them difficult. Furthermore most devices are 
individually owned. Thus universities are unable to directly control how they are used 
but do have a duty of care towards those learning and teaching within their spaces. 
This article outlines preliminary findings on how some British universities are 
responding to these challenges by seeking to capitalise on potential pedagogic 
benefits while limiting information-privacy risks posed by new patterns of usage. It 
found that these universities converge in their recognition that students are using or 
want to use MCTs to capture content in teaching spaces. However they diverge in 
how they respond, in particular, on what uses are restricted and how competing 
rights, for instance, disability versus privacy, are negotiated. 
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Introduction1 
Video clips of lecturers breaching university policy, ranting or trying to provoke 
debate in class have gone viral (Carvin, 2007; Stripling, 2010; Deci, 2013).  Audio 
clips recorded on a mobile phone are at the centre of a court case into allegations of 
sexual harassment by a professor (Hindustan Times, 2013). The internet posting and 
tweeting of a webcam recording of a sexual encounter in a dormitory room is 
understood to be behind a student killing himself (Gray, 2012). What were quasi-
private spaces in universities are becoming increasing porous as mobile 
communication technologies (MCTs) - mobile phones, tablets, netbooks and laptops 
– enable the capture, upload and mass dissemination of everyday engagements. 
This article explores how some British universities are responding to the pedagogic 
benefits and the unpredictable risks and consequences for institutions and 
individuals of the capture and dissemination of classroom interactions.  
Universities have a long history of using new technologies to enhance 
teaching and MCTs are no exception. Higher education studies have highlighted the 
potential benefits to learning from including MCTs into teaching as well as classroom 
disruptions from ringing mobile phones, texting, etc. (see Campbell, 2006) However, 
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little attention has been paid in this literature to the more serious information-privacy 
risks posed by ungoverned capture of daily interactions and the implications for 
universities. The social science literature has drawn attention to these risks in other 
contexts as well as government attempts to curb abuses (see Ibrahim, 2010b) but 
little attention has been paid to the particular implications for university governance. 
This article argues that this is a major gap and its response has been to attempt to 
bridge these two bodies of literature through an exploration of emerging policies on 
the use and misuse of MCTs in British universities.  
MCT-related information-privacy risks arise from how the devices may be 
used to capture and upload personal information exchanged in everyday 
engagements (see Ibrahim, 2010b). The potential for large-scale dissemination on 
the internet not only raises the possibility of wider public scrutiny it also presents 
possible risks for institutions and individuals when private and/or sensitive personal 
information is made public (see, Solove, 2004; Ibrahim 2010b). These possibilities 
need to be managed if universities if the new technologies are to be used to enhance 
education. The problem, however, is policies devised to govern the recording, use 
and dissemination policies governing older technologies may be ill-equipped to deal 
with MCTs because of the particular functionalities of the latter. Some British 
universities have recognised this and begun to develop MCT-specific policies to 
manage the particular opportunities and challenges, benefits and risks they pose. 
These institutions are in the vanguard of thinking about the governance of new 
technologies and the dissemination of what they are doing may provide a useful 
steer to other institutions around the world dealing with similar issues. The empirical 
analysis outlined here is located within and framed by social science studies on the 
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nature of MCTs and of information-privacy risks. The findings are preliminary ones 
and more research is needed but hopefully a useful start has been made here.  
 
Historical Context: Governing Communication Technologies into Higher 
Education 
For well over a century universities have used new technologies to enhance teaching 
and learning in a wide range of fields from languages and music to medicine (see 
Salaberry, 2001). Traditionally this involved bringing captured sounds, images and 
texts from the outside world into the classroom to illustrate theory, concepts and 
models, analyse phenomena and case studies or to engage students. Or it has 
involved the use of computers for record management, data analysis, word 
processing and plagiarism checks. Much of this usage went largely unchallenged by 
the wider society. However, in the 1980s this changed with the advent of the new 
technologies including the facsimile machine, photocopier, video player/recorder and 
computer databases. These exposed competing interests and rights between users 
and owners of information which needed to be negotiated and managed (see 
Ginsburg, 1991). For instance the recording, copying, reproducing, analysis and 
storage capabilities of these technologies not only offered new ways to enhance 
teaching, learning, student engagement and administration, they also put at risk 
intellectual property and data protection rights and interests. The resulting tensions 
were negotiated in three ways in Britain.  
The first centred on the intellectual property concerns of third parties. 
Universities were allowed to copy, record or reproduce content under “fair use” 
provisions (see, Ginsburg, 1991). That is, use was restricted to educational purposes 
– teaching and personal research – and was contingent on the terms and express 
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consent of the owners of the content, the copyright holders. A limited number of 
copies could be made and in some cases none at all or with strict conditions about 
how much could be shown, whether a recording could be made of this and 
responsibility for managing this lay with the institution (see Ginsburg, 1991).  
The second negotiation emerged out of government policy shifts in the late 
1990s intended to ensure more disabled students went to university. The result was 
a legal requirement for universities to make “reasonable adjustments” for disabled 
students so as to ensure any disadvantage accruing from their disability was limited 
(see Doyle and Robson, 2002). This entailed the waiving of normal copyright 
restrictions on recordings, copies and transcriptions for certain students with 
particular disabilities but with the proviso that these were for personal study 
purposes only. Some universities provided recording devices for students or allowed 
them to record but specified conditions and procedures rooted in evaluations of 
need, use and consent.  
The third negotiation emerged out of concerns over the capture, storage and 
management of personal information. As universities began to gather and store more 
data on staff and students they needed to ensure their management of this was 
compliant with European data protection law. This seeks to protect the privacy rights 
of individuals by ensuring that the personal information about them that is “held, 
processed and used” by organizations is “managed properly” (Lyon, 2002). Central 
to this is the concept of personal information discussed later. Suffice to say here that 
data protection is concerned with institutional processes and safeguards intended to 
ensure that collection of personal information of individuals during the course of their 
business is not inadvertently released into the wider society.  
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Traditionally these arrangements – for intellectual property, disabled and data 
protection rights – allowed universities to use technologies to manage their spaces 
and enhance teaching but subject to certain conditions which sought to protect the 
interest of others and balanced possible conflict between competing rights. These 
policies arguably have been more or less effective because they are institution-
centric in the sense that they entail university-controlled capture, use, dissemination 
or management of content or data. In contrast, mobile devices are individual-centric 
in that its owner has considerable agency over what to record, when, how and what 
use to make of it. The problem for universities is that they have relatively little direct 
control over such devices because they do not own them but they do have a duty of 
care to staff and students for what happens within their spaces. This conundrum of a 
lack of control yet responsible offers qualitatively different problems to those posed 
by earlier technologies. The particular problems related to information-privacy have 
yet to be seriously addressed in the higher education literature where the main 
emphasis has been on the teaching and learning benefits accruing from 
incorporating mobile devices into the classroom.  
 
Higher Education Studies, MCTs and Universities 
Higher education studies echo many of the historic arguments for the appropriation 
of earlier technologies. For instance, they have highlighted the pedagogic value of 
students being able to access digitally recorded lecture content (Toppin, 2011 p. 
383). Playback is seen as helpful in addressing remediation and retention issues in 
learning as well as in reversing high rates of drop-out, failure and withdrawal 
(Toppin, 2011, p. 393). Furthermore, there is growing student demand for recorded 
material; but the central facilities needed to provide this are costly and not all 
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universities can or are willing to invest in these (Chandra, 2007). Student-owned 
MCTs, with their inbuilt recording capabilities, are seen as offering a cheaper, more 
flexible and practical alternative. MCTs are pervasive: 94 percent of students at one 
British institution are regular users of mobile phones (Davidson and Lutman, 2007) 
and 95 percent of students in a university in northeastern USA bring theirs to class 
every day (Tindell and Bohlander, 2012). It is hardly surprising therefore that 
universities should seek to capitalize on this potential and higher education studies 
have seen this as signalling a new, individualized approach to learning: “just-in-time, 
just enough and just-for-me” (Traxler, 2007, p14, in Belshaw 2011). Potential 
benefits go beyond the cost effective provision of lecture recordings; they include the 
empowering of the learner through student-controlled capture and mobile, flexible 
access and use (see Belshaw, 2011 p. 8).  
Higher education studies have not ignored the potential misuses of MCTs, but 
tend to view these as “potential pitfalls” (Kukulska-Hulme and Traxler 2005 p. 97) or 
“challenges” (Tindell and Bohlander, 2012) the implications of which are largely 
confined to the classroom. For instance, studies found that one third of students play 
videogames on mobile phones and laptops during class; 92 percent text message 
during class time; 10 percent did so during an examination; and most believe faculty 
are “largely unaware” of the extent to which they are accessing SMS, browsing the 
Internet and sending pictures during class time (Gilroy 2004, in Campbell, 2006; 
Tindell and Bohlander, 2012). Other concerns are that content delivered via a 
different platform such as MCTs may disadvantage some disabled students 
(Kukulska-Hulme and Traxler 2005, p. 192), ringing phones may disrupt learning and 
MCTs may be used to cheat in examinations (Campbell, 2006). Clearly such 
disruptive and distracting activities are problems that need to be managed, but their 
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implications are largely confined to the classroom. The premise in these studies is 
that classrooms are still bounded spaces where what goes on there remains within 
that preserve and so is quasi-private. The wider social science literature and real 
case examples cast doubt on this premise. These highlight how convergence and 
connectivity not only means MCTs can be used to access course material they also 
pose a range of potential risks. 
  
MCTs, the Social Sciences and Risk  
MCTs are pervasive and embodied in that they are small, lightweight and ultra-
portable. They are carried almost continuously on the body by the overwhelming 
majority of the population and this enables anytime, anywhere use by almost anyone 
(see Ibrahim 2010b). What distinguishes them from other portable devices is that 
they are multi-functional, combining the communicative (phone, email, Twitter, 
Twitpic, etc.), with content (recording, storage and retrieval capabilities), connectivity 
(access to the Internet and social media sites) and convergence (recording, 
uploading, downloading, editing, etc).  
 It is unsurprising, given this multi-functionality and the widespread use of 
MCTs among 18–24 year olds that universities should seek to extend their long 
history of appropriating technologies into learning by doing likewise with MCTs. It is 
surprising how little mention is made in higher education studies of the social science 
literature that highlights a range of potential risks arising from this that need to be 
governed. These include enhanced capabilities not only to record, store and retrieve 
but also to upload what has been captured onto social network sites where anything 
from the banal to the significant in everyday life can be mass-disseminated and 
opened to public scrutiny (Ibrahim, 2010b). This makes possible the “narration of … 
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spaces which may not be accessible to the rest of the world” and the creation of “a 
new visibility” in which events, personal accounts and images from everyday spaces 
– public, private and hybrid public–private – can be shared with a wider audience via 
social network sites (Ibrahim, 2010a).  While much of this research has focused on 
other spaces there is little reason to believe that university spaces will be immune, 
especially given a generation of young people who have grown up with social media. 
Furthermore, the “consumption of private details … sustains the culture of gaze and 
the curiosity of the invisible audience” and creates its own demand for content 
captured in the everyday and communicated within and beyond the networks 
(Ibrahim, 2010b).  
 This has a number of potentially unpredictable consequences. On the one 
hand, “new visibilities” derived when everyday interactions in previously bounded 
spaces are captured then catapulted into a public arena can expose power, the 
abuses of it or perceived abuses (see Beer and Burrows, 2007). On the other hand, 
ethical issues are raised when the recording of image or sound, actions and opinions 
of the non-powerful takes place without their prior alert or consent and sometimes in 
ways that misrepresent what was said or done (see Ibrahim, 2010b; Reading, 2009). 
Subsequent dissemination of such personal information potentially exposes unwilling 
and unwitting individuals to possible discrimination, manipulation, victimization and 
abuse thus creating “new vulnerabilities” (see Ibrahim 2010b; 2011). In MCT-
dominated conditions, the boundaries between what is public and what is private 
became increasingly porous and “new risks” emerge (see Ibrahim 2010b; 2011) 
especially when the dissemination of private information is unlimited by space or 
time, invisible in that the moment of capture may be impossible to detect, and 
pervasive and proximate because of the carrying of MCTs on the body everywhere. 
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The rendering of quasi-private spaces porous has profound implications for 
information-privacy. 
   
MCTs, Information-privacy and the Managing of a Potentially Porous Space 
Information-privacy matters centre on an individual’s ability to control the collection, 
storage and dissemination of personal information about themselves (see Fenwick 
and Phillipson, 2006 p. 662). Personal information is “about an identifiable living 
individual” regardless of whether they are captured in image, sound or text (JISC 
2012, p.3). It is not limited to demographic characteristics.  It includes expressions of 
political and religious beliefs, opinions, observations, associations and lifestyle 
choices (see Froomkin, 2000). The premise is that the unauthorized capture of such 
information in any format on any device including MCTs poses privacy risks by 
potentially exposing individuals to unwanted scrutiny by others including by 
governments; discrimination based on their ideas, beliefs or opinions; possible curbs 
on their freedom to choose what to believe, think or act; or in extreme cases physical 
harm (see Froomkin, 2000; Marwick, Murgia-Diaz and Palfrey 2010, p. 2).  
Concerns about these risks have informed the EU tendency towards a 
proactive, social protectionist approach to information-privacy rights on the Internet 
which presumes that “generalized harm already exists … we need not wait for 
specific abuses to occur” (Solove, 2004, p.96). It also presumes that government 
and other public authorities have a moral responsibility to protect the information-
privacy rights of individuals through law, policies, protocols and codes of practice 
(see Reidenberg, 2006). The pervasiveness, ultra-portability, multi-functionality and 
anytime-anywhere-anyone use of MCTs pose particular challenges here. 
Convergence and connectivity mean that any MCT user can capture personal 
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information in the form of the comments and actions of anyone with whom they come 
into contact. Doing so in image - or sound - increases the likelihood that the 
individual subject can be identified and adds credibility to this (see Durham Peters, 
2001). The potential for covert capture of conversations and actions on MCTs 
renders the subject powerless to know if personal information is being recorded, or 
prevent it from being so. Once captured information can be uploaded onto social 
network sites; (re)contextualized in that new meanings are created as the original 
context is minimized or ignored; edited or (re)produced in new creative forms such 
as mashups, videogames and spoofs; and then potentially mass-disseminated for 
public scrutiny. These processes create “new visibilities” and “new vulnerabilities” 
around the unauthorized capture of personal information, and such has been the 
concern of governments around the world that they are now introducing new laws on 
the circumstances in which images can or cannot be captured on mobile phones 
(Ibrahim, 2010b). Crucially these are not aimed at preventing the dissemination of 
unauthorized images, arguably because in today’s dispersed media ecologies this 
may be impossible. Instead, they aim to control – and in some cases criminalize – 
routine, unauthorized or covert visual capture on MCTs of ordinary people without 
their prior knowledge or consent (see Ibrahim, 2010b). However, universities cannot 
leave this to governments to regulate; they are responsible for their own spaces.  
 
MCTs, Information-privacy and University Governance  
The question then is what are the implications for universities? The “new visibilities”, 
“new vulnerabilities” and new information-privacy risks in universities pose 
challenges that earlier technologies did not. The latter entailed the capture of 
material from the outside world and bringing it into the classroom to aid teaching and 
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learning but the control lay with the institution and staff. MCTs invert this. Direct 
control of use does not lie primarily with the institution but the individual owner of the 
device; the most an institution can offer are indirect controls. That is, they can 
specify the use or behaviour expected and the consequences for breaches of this. 
The problem is the multi-functionality of MCTs. That is, they can be used to capture 
overtly or covertly what goes on in university spaces, the content can then be 
uploaded onto social media sites and from there it can be mass disseminated so 
making public what previously would have been contained in the bounded space of a 
classroom or dormitory room. What may have been a robust, legitimate comment or 
act in the classroom may not be acceptable, appreciated and understood in other 
socio-cultural contexts, including the one from which the student (of staff member) 
comes, may return to or want to enter into in terms of future employment. In these 
other contexts ideas may assume more culturally and politically subversive, offensive 
or inflammatory meanings. This re-contextualization of captured content may have 
unpredictable consequences for individual students and staff.  
 These risks are not hypothetical. There a growing number of examples of 
such everyday covert capture, upload and dissemination. In one case, an American 
school pupil distributed a recording of a teacher making comments that he felt 
violated school policy; some of his peers complained at being captured without their 
consent; and the authorities banned the recording of lessons (Carvin 2007). Social 
media innovations and usages allow for new forms of mass dissemination including 
viral tweets, emails, Youtube, etc. Clips that went viral include a Cornell University 
lecturer getting agitated over a student’s loud yawns; a Louisiana State professor 
who attempted to provoke debate by appearing to attack conservatives over global 
warming; a Central Florida professor criticizing a class he thinks is ‘full of cheaters’ 
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(Stripling 2010); and a college professor caught in a seemingly anti-war veteran ‘rant’ 
(Deci, 2013). 
 While some of these may be amusing or offensive, others may entail more 
sinister public humiliation, entrapment or manipulation with tragic consequences. 
One such case was Rutgers student Tyler Clementi whose roommate used a secret 
webcam to record him in a sexual encounter, posted on the clip on the internet and 
tweeted it. Clementi killed himself. His tormenter was found guilty and jailed for 
(homosexual) bias, intimidation and invasion of privacy (Gray, 2012). The incident 
shocked America, drew attention to the problem of cyber-bullying at university and 
led to a new federal law (see The Eagle Online, 2012). Clips captured on mobile 
devices need not be visual to be damaging. A professor in Gurgaon, India, is 
currently on bail after ‘allegedly molesting and seeking sexual favours from a third 
year law student’ in return for good grades (Hindustan Times 2013). The student 
produced audio clips purportedly of the conversation captured on her mobile phone. 
The case has divided students with some protesting against the college’s inaction 
over the complaint of sexual harassment  and others submitting a memorandum to 
the police commissioner claiming accused had been “framed” (Hindustan Times 
2013).  
The risks are not limited to the capture and dissemination of engagements, 
Cheap, easily available editing tools mean clips can be altered in ways that, 
according to Cary Nelson ‘”amounts to the public misrepresentation of what has 
taken place in classrooms’ but is ‘combined with the incredible persuasiveness of 
video”’ so given a degree of credibility (Stripling, 2010).There have been cases of 
students selective editing videos of teachers in class then posting them on YouTube 
or creating fake Facebook pages in the teacher’s name with the purpose of 
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damaging their reputation. A recent report highlighted the growing problem of 
educational professionals being subjected to online abuse and added that ‘we are 
also starting to see the use of mobile phone technology for abuse’ (Phippen, 2012 p. 
2). A similar patter is happening on student chatrooms and Facebook pages 
(Phippen, 2012). 
The problems for universities is that these potential risks are still largely 
unknown and little understood. Innovation and new capabilities are evolving rapidly, 
usage is adaptive and not always in ways that the creators of the technology 
envisaged. Furthermore, organizations have to balance existing rights – disabled 
and intellectual property – with the potential pedagogic benefits and the likelihood 
that recording could be happening anyway. Notwithstanding these difficulties a 
handful of universities in Britain have developed MCT-specific policies that take 
account of the distinctive features – in particular the connectivity and convergence – 
of the technology and attempt to facilitate appropriate use while discouraging 
inappropriate use in the classrooms. The advantage of focusing on Britain is that the 
student population is diverse, it includes a large international contingent and that one 
of the researchers is located there so has some familiarity with developments. The 
following empirical analysis sets out preliminary findings from the first research of its 
kind to explore university policies specifically aimed at governing MCT use within 
their spaces. This is not to suggest that other more generic policies at other British 
universities cannot be evoked to manage the potential use and abuses of MCTs. 
What it does signify is the recognition by some that MCTs pose particular challenges 
that may require particular policies. 
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Empirical Analysis 
The aim was to create a snapshot of MCT-policies across the sector at a particular 
moment in time. In order to create a comprehensive data-set a freedom of 
information (FOI) request was sent to 121 British universities – excluding the Open 
University and private ones – in late 2011 and early 2012 for their formal policies on 
recording teaching sessions. The request was restricted to formal policies, that is, 
those that had been adopted at the time so were in operation and should be 
available to staff, students and the public. The result was an 89 percent response 
rate. The analysis that follows needs to be caveated. First, the theoretical emphasis 
in this article is on MCT pervasiveness and multi-functionality, and the information-
privacy implications of this. The data on lecture capture and other social media 
policies have left for another paper. The empirical analysis has been restricted to 
MCT-specific policies that deal with student recordings – just over 12 percent of all 
the policies provided – and is based on the analysis of documents provided by 
universities. This is not to say that universities that do not have MCT-specific policies 
do not draw on other mechanisms for governing these; for example, in more generic 
IT or information/social media policies. What it does say is that a handful of 
universities perceive MCTs as posing particular, distinctive challenges that warrant 
governance by policies that specifically cater to these. That is, they signify the most 
evolved thinking and policies in the sector at a moment in time. Second, a number of 
universities at the time indicated that their policies in this area were currently under 
review and some kindly provided these draft documents. These have not been 
analysed here because they had yet to be adopted, were still open to change and so 
not yet formal policies being implemented at the time of data collection. Follow-up 
research will capture these and the policies analysed here that subsequent to data 
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collection were reviewed, for instance, in the case of Manchester. The following 
findings need to be seen as a snapshot in time. Third, all the universities cited here 
were sent the ‘findings’ to check that these were fair and accurate representations of 
their policies in early 2012. Where they have responded with changes these have 
been incorporated; where they did not respond it has been assumed the analysis is 
accurate.  
 
Findings 
The starting premise in most of these specific policies is that MCT capture is already 
a fact of university life. The devices are seen as pervasive and that recording by 
students is either already taking place (St Andrews University, 2011) or that they  
want to record (see Durham University, 2011; Roehampton University 2011). Beyond 
this, three broad approaches are discernible. The first approach can be found in 
those university policies premised on an understanding that irrespective of use, any 
recording has implications for “third party’s right to privacy, data protection and 
copyright” and that policy needs to manage this (University of York, 2010). There is 
also the assumption that information-privacy “is affected” by capture because it 
renders the “personality, behaviour and opinions” of individuals “open and potentially 
freely accessible” (Durham University, 2011). The policies are comprehensive in that 
they cover capture of any teaching session in video or audio format on any device 
used by any student, including those with disabilities (see Durham University, 2011; 
St Andrews University, 2011; Westminster University, 2009). Beyond this, different 
strategies can be discerned. Westminster University starts from the premise that all 
mobile devices will be switched off during teaching sessions unless the consent of 
the lecturer/tutor has been secured for recording to take place (2009). Others 
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assume MCT recording by students is taking place and that the university needs to 
prevent covert capture by setting out conditions when it would be legitimate (see 
Durham University, 2011; Manchester University, 2011; n.d.; St Andrews University, 
2011). Responsibility for managing this is devolved to the individual lecturer/tutor. In 
some cases students are required to be informed that the recording of lectures is 
taking place and their consent is required for recording of sessions other than 
lectures (see Durham, 2011). In other cases, no recording at all is allowed without 
the prior consent of staff and students (see Manchester University, 2011, n.d.; St 
Andrews University, 2011); and conditions are also placed on MCT-capture by 
disabled students. It is assumed that they will normally be allowed to record provided 
that they have registered with Disability Services and have secured the consent of 
the lecturer/tutor (Westminster University, 2009) and/or other students (Durham 
University, 2011). There is also recognition in University of York’s policy (2010) that 
the “legal requirement” to allow a disabled student to record gives rise to “potential 
conflicts” should other students object to being recorded, and these need to be 
“handled sensitively” given the pre-eminence of disabled rights. Other university 
policies presume disabled students will be allowed to record but do not treat this as 
an absolute right. Instead they set out the conditions in which the lecturer or tutor 
retains the right to instruct recording to stop during the teaching session because of 
information-privacy risks where minors or client/patient confidentiality is implicated, 
sensitive topics are being discussed or other students have objected to being 
recorded, particularly in seminars (see Durham University, 2011; St Andrews 
University, 2011; Westminster University, 2009).  
Breaches of MCT policies include covert capture, and the consequences 
include possible formal disciplinary action by the university (see Durham University, 
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2011) or action by a professional body in the event that patient/client confidentiality is 
breached (see Manchester University, 2011), in which case the student could be 
disbarred from ever practising. The pre-eminence of information-privacy is 
entrenched in the right of the individual to know, to consent and to object to being 
recorded; in the procedures needed to ensure this right; and in the consequences for 
breaches of it. Disabled rights are not equated with an entitlement to record but with 
an obligation to make alternative arrangements that meet the needs of the disabled 
students without compromising the rights of others. The negotiation of competing 
rights is thus not seen as a zero-sum game in which information-privacy rights are 
subordinated to disabled ones; both are seen as having equal validity and the 
responsibility of the university is to find ways to respect and meet both.  
The second approach distinguishes between MCT capture of lectures and 
seminars. Audio-capture is assumed to pose minimal information-privacy risks, so 
the recording of lectures is seen as acceptable but students have a right to be 
alerted that this is taking place; the recording of seminars is at the discretion of the 
lecturer; and the consent of staff and students is only required where video-capture 
is taking place (see Reading University 2011a; 2011b). The exception is where 
recording would include children or issues of client/patient confidentiality, in which 
case it would be deemed “inappropriate”. Any recordings can be used for the 
student’s personal study, they cannot be handed to anyone else and they must be 
destroyed at the end of their studies. Breaches of this rule can lead to disciplinary 
action. Such policies start from a much narrower conception of personal information 
based on the assumption that the individual can be recognized if their face is 
captured but not their voice. Students are afforded some individual agency in their 
right to know their oral contributions are being recorded but not in their right to object 
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to this. The only power of veto they have is over visual capture. Interestingly, third 
party privacy rights – children and patient/client confidentiality – supersede the 
presumption that disabled students will be allowed to record.  
The third approach sanctions MCT capture by “all students” in nearly all 
lectures and seminars on any device and, given the silence on this in the documents 
provided, presumably in visual and audio format as well. There is an expectation that 
as a “courtesy” requests should be made to record guest speakers and that in 
seminars it be “cleared with the group as a matter of courtesy” (Roehampton 
University, n.d.).  Thus there is no explicit information-privacy provision in the 
policies for student or staff right to know, to object to or to consent to recording. The 
justification for this would appear to be that “teaching staff are required by law and … 
university policy to allow disabled students to record” unless the discussion is of a 
“highly personal nature” to students. These are limited to exceptional circumstances 
and then the lecturer has to “ask” disability services “first” before intervening to stop 
recording. Roehampton University did consider the possibility that recording might 
“inhibit” seminar discussion but decided this was not a reason to prevent it (2008). 
While the other two approaches seek to govern MCTs at the point of capture and of 
use, this approach aims to control it only at the point of use by specifying that 
recordings may only be used for personal study and cannot be passed on to anyone 
else.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This article has been concerned with the preliminary findings on how some British 
universities are responding to the information-privacy challenges and risks posed by 
the content, capture, connectivity and convergence features of MCTs. It suggested 
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that the nature of these technologies is such that it can no longer be assumed that 
private spaces are bounded spaces; they are becoming porous. The emphasis in the 
existing higher education literature on the potential pedagogic benefits of these 
devices is invaluable; but it only tells half of the story. If the potential educational 
benefits are to be realized then the potential social risks need to be recognized and 
managed. However responses to earlier technologies do not provide much of a 
steer. These evolved policies aimed at balancing intellectual property, disability and 
data protection interests, rights and uses but their effectiveness lay in the control 
staff had of the technologies. MCTs now threaten to destabilize these by introducing 
a new category of risk – that of information-privacy. The governance of this is 
fiendishly difficult because most of the mobile devices carried and used on 
campuses are not owned by the university but the institution has a duty of care to 
those on its premises. At the same it has legal obligations to facilitate the 
engagement of disabled students. The project outlined here therefore sought to 
ascertain how British universities were seeking to negotiate these limitations and 
competing obligations. 
The preliminary work has focused only on those that have evolved MCT-
specific policies to address both the potential benefits and risks of student capture of 
classroom interactions as well as the negotiation of conflicting interests and rights. It 
found some convergence in the justification for MCT specific policies based on the 
pervasiveness of the devices, the likelihood students were already recording covertly 
or overtly, and demand to be able to record for learning purposes. However, the 
difficulties of how to respond to these become apparent in key divergences between 
university policies over: 
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 whether control the university could have should be at the point of capture, 
use and dissemination or only at the point of dissemination;  
 whether staff should control what is recorded, when and how or whether this 
should be largely devolved to students albeit with some caveats on the use of 
the captured material; 
 whether disabled rights took precedence over information privacy rights or 
whether there would be circumstances where they do not and in which case 
alternative provision is required by law; 
 whether students and staff had a right to know, to consent and to refuse 
consent to be recorded or not 
 whether that only applied to visual recording or to audio as well 
These contradictions point to the recognition on the part of these universities of the 
distinctiveness of MCTs that warrant a specific policy; considerable uncertainty about 
how to negotiate competing rights and interests; as well as practical problems of 
governing the use of device that the university does not own nor directly control.  
 These findings are from a preliminary work on a self-selecting sampling of 
universities that indicated they had MCT-specific policies. This is not to suggest that 
other universities do not have policies that govern these. Nor does it imply that these 
are stand-alone policies because in practice they may well need to be read in 
conjunction with other ones on the use of social media sites such as Facebook. 
However, it does provide a snapshot in time of those universities that recognized that 
MCTs warrant specific policies governing their use and thus signify some of the most 
evolved thinking in the British sector on these. Other papers are in the process of 
being written and a bigger project is planned. For now it was felt the preliminary 
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findings should be made available as they are potentially of practical use for 
universities around the world grappling with similar issues.  
 
Notes 
1 This project initially emerged in the author’s capacity as a local union official and 
the wish to make an informed contribution to an internal policy debate at the time. 
When she stepped down from this official role she turned the work into a formal 
research project able to inform debates in other universities. All of the universities 
were contacted and informed of the aims, objectives, publication intentions and the 
conflicts of interest arising from union involvement in the original work. They were 
also informed that the findings would be published using similar principles that apply 
to research council grants.  
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